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ABSTRACT
SAUDI ARABIA'S USE
OF AIR POWER CAPABILITIES
TO SECURE ITS NATIONAL SECURITY ASSETS
IN THE NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF ARENA
By
Ian M. Raimundo
University of New Hampshire, May 2009

Iran represents the primary threat to Saudi Arabia's foreign national
security interests. Iranian hostility originates in the 1979 Iranian Islamic
Revolution a n d also consists of threats to Saudi Arabia's internal security.1
Saudi Arabia's strategy to safeguard its national security assets, including
petroleum processing and export facilities vital to the smooth flow of
crude oil, relies on an a d v a n c e d air defense capability to provide early
warning of an aircraft or ballistic missile attack.
In contrast to the expected outcome of Robert Jervis' theory, a
greater quantity of weapons but an overall decreased level of security,
Saudi Arabia has increased their foreign security with respect to the
Iranian c o m b a t aircraft threat to their national security interests in the
Persian Gulf. Current developments by the two sides indicates an
increasing downwards 'spiral of hostility' as each side acquires arms to
offsets the others' increase in security.
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INTRODUCTION

Iran represents the primary threat to Saudi Arabia's foreign national
security interests. Iranian hostility originates in the 1979 Iranian Islamic
Revolution and also consists of threats to Saudi Arabia's internal security.1
Saudi Arabia status as 'the world's largest producer and exporter of total
petroleum liquids' depends on two petroleum processing and export
facilities.2 Protection of these facilities from conventional and
unconventional attacks is essential to Saudi Arabia's ability to process and
export crude and should therefore be of foremost concern to consumers
of Saudi Arabian crude oil.

Chapter 1 discusses case and theory justifications for this research.
The importance of Saudi Arabia as a reliable producer of crude oil to
global markets a n d the need to safeguard two petroleum processing and
exporting facilities, Saudi Arabia's primary national security assets is
explained. As the House of Saud, the dynasty that governs Saudi Arabia,

must counter unconventional threats to the internal stability and security
ot the state, including organized militant Islamic groups that have
targeted the Kingdom's oil facilities, a brief overview of the importance of
internal security is outlined. More detailed information regarding the
internal security and stability is provided in the endnotes section.3
Robert Jervis' theory expects when states acquire arms to increase
their security, other states are inadvertently threatened, and also acquire
arms, leading to an overall decrease in security. Jervis' theory is used to
explore Saudi Arabia's security policy, which center on the capabilities of
air power, to evaluate whether the Kingdom's defense acquisitions have
increased, or, as the theory expects, decreased its security when
compared to the capabilities of Iran, the Kingdom's foremost adversary.

Chapter 2 discusses Saudi Arabia's security policy and compares
the capabilities of the Royal Saudi Air Force and Air Defense Forces to the
Iranian Air Force. In the 1970s Saudi Arabia relied on the Shah of Iran to
provide air security for its northern and eastern territories, including the
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Persian Gulf oil-producing region. 4 The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in September 1980 altered Iran's status
as the Kingdom's security provider to the foremost security threat. 5 In
response to the newly hostile Iran, Saudi Arabia procured an advanced
early-warning air defense capability from the United States that continues
to serve as the Kingdom's primary means to safeguard its national security
assets and population centers.
One aspect of Jervis' theory that does not apply concerns the
presence of a regional hegemon. In 1980 President Carter declared the
Persian Gulf oilfields as vital to the national security interests of the United
States.6 The presence of the United States as the regional hegemon in the
Persian Gulf is an important element of Saudi Arabia's foreign and internal
security.7

Chapter 3 discusses the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to
increase its foreign security in response to the conventional Iranian aircraft
and ballistic missile threat. Although there are two spirals of hostility
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between the two sides, the spirals originate from a common source, the
1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, the second spiral is the
direct result of Iran's over-dependence on the United States for military
hardware, support, and training services; the results of Iran's efforts to
indigenously produce ballistic missile have only recently coming to fruition
since 1998.8
The second spiral involves the reaction of Saudi Arabia and the five
other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to Iran's
ballistic missile program. The GCC states are acquiring the most
advanced terminal-area anti-ballistic missile system and networking their
air defense assets to improve coordination and overall effectiveness.9
Further indicative of a developing 'spiral of hostility,' the GCC states are
pursuing additional combat aircraft despite their already uncontested air
supremacy over Iran.10
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CHAPTER 1

CASE AND THEORY JUSTIFICATIONS

This research is an examination of Saudi Arabia's foreign security
policy, concentrating on measures a d o p t e d to safeguard its petroleum
processing and export facilities from the threat of an air strike. Robert
Jervis' theory expects states attempting to increase their security by
acquiring weaponry to experience a decrease, not increase, in their
overall security. Jervis terms the mutual action-reaction process a security
dilemma, and the concept is applied to evaluate whether Saudi Arabia's
defense acquisitions have increased or decreased its foreign security
when compared to the capabilities of a specific adversary.

Saudi Arabia is a global heavyweight in the realm of crude oil
production. 11 The Kingdom's crude oil resources are the single largest
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concentration of crude oil and consist of an estimated 267 billion barrels
of crude oil, which is between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's
total known reserves; Saudi Arabia also maintains the largest crude
production capacity in the world, estimated at 10.5 to 11 million barrels
per day in 2007.12 Saudi Arabia's importance as a reliable oil producer is
expected to increase as long-term global crude oil consumption
continues to grow. 13

The House of Saud, Saudi Arabia's ruling dynasty, have proved
themselves to be reliable custodians of their petroleum resources since
1973 and have generally sided with United States policy in the intra and
extra Persian Gulf arenas. 14 Maintaining the primacy of the House of Saud
and the internal stability and security of Saudi Arabia, although outside
the focus of this research, should also be of importance to consumers of
crude oil. Should violent regime change remove the Al-Saud from power,
their successors may reduce or entirely shut-off the flow of oil, as was the
case after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, with disastrous
consequences to the American and global economy. 15
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Section 1: The Economic Criticalitv of Crude Oil

'Saudi Arabia is the world's largest producer and exporter of total
petroleum liquids and is currently the world's second largest crude oil
producer behind Russia.'16 In 2002 Saudi Arabian and United States
intelligence discovered Al-Qaeda sympathizers 'had infiltrated Saudi
ARAMCO and were planning to destroy key Saudi oil facilities.'17
As a raw feedstock, crude oil is a versatile commodity that can be
chemically altered for use in a variety of applications from combustion in
aircraft engines to the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals to asphalt used
for paving roads and highways.18 In the realm of transportation, which
accounts for nearly two-thirds of America's total petroleum consumption,
refined derivatives of crude oil, including aviation kerosene, gasoline, or
diesel fuels provides 97% of the raw energy input required.19
The United States consumes approximately 20 million barrels of
crude oil per day, nearly one-quarter of daily global oil consumption.20
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Crude oil is therefore a critical component of the American economy, the
high price of which can exert a 'calamitous' effect on the American way
of life; 'nine of the last ten U.S. recessions were preceded by an increase
in crude oil prices, and statistical tests have demonstrated that this was
not coincidental.' 21 The United States currently imports nearly two-thirds of
its crude oil from foreign sources.22 In 2006 and 2007 Saudi Arabia
exported an average of 1.46 and 1.49 million barrels per day, respectively,
to the United States, accounting for 12% of the United States' total crude
imports.23
Domestic crude oil production from sources in the continental
United States and Gulf of Mexico peaked in December 1970 at slightly
over 10 million barrels per day.24 Afterwards, U.S. crude production
entered a 'steady and relentless decline,' ending the 'century-long run
during which the United States dominated global oil supply,' despite the
addition of crude extracted from reservoirs in Alaska.25 As United States oil
production steadily declined, Saudi Arabian production steadily
increased, due largely to naturally high reservoir pressures at five highly
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prolific fields.26 The Oil and Gas Journal, a petroleum industry publication,
assesses that Saudi Arabia contains approximately 267 billion barrels of
crude oil, amounting to nearly one-fifth of the world's proven reserves.27
Nearly two-thirds of Saudi Arabian crude is considered Arabian Light or
Arabian Extra Light, grades considered economically desirable due to
their lower processing costs.28 The Kingdom 'maintains the world's largest
crude oil production capacity, estimated to be around 10.5-11 million
barrels per day.'2930
Although the smooth flow of Saudi Arabian crude to global energy
markets depends on a network of more than 9,000 miles of pipeline,
dozens of gas-oil separator plants, pumping stations, and individual
wellheads, two specific facilities are of critical importance.31 Measured in
terms of volume, Saudi ARAMCO's Abqaiq stabilization facility, 30 miles
inland from the Persian Gulf, is the world's most productive oil processing
facility.32 Abqaiq processes more than 7 million barrels per day of Arabian
Light and Arabian Extra Light crude from southern area oil wells, removes
hydrogen sulfur and other contaminants, reduces vapor pressure, and

9

forwards the majority of the processed crude to Ras Tanurah for export.33
The processing operations at Abqaiq are essential for the safe transport of
crude. Kenneth Pollack describes the criticality of the Abqaiq facility to
the global economy as 'the beating heart,' further claiming 'if there is any
one facility on Earth whose loss could cause massive, widespread
economic damage, Abqaiq is it.'34 In February 2006 Saudi Arabian
authorities foiled an attempt by Al-Qaeda to destroy the Abqaiq facility
using explosives mounted in trucks.35 Should an attack on the Abqaiq
facility inhibit the ability to process crude there is no alternative facility to
process nearly two-thirds of valuable Arabian Light and Arabian Extra
Light crude oils and Saudi Arabia's ability to export crude will at best be
reduced or at worst completely cease.36
The Kingdom exports more than lb% of its crude oil from Saudi
ARAMCO's Ras Tanurah maritime complex, the world's largest crude
export facility at Ras Tanurah and Juyaymah on the Persian Gulf coast,
which has an export capacity of 6 million barrels per day. The Kingdom's
current export capacity is estimated at between 14-15 million barrels per
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day.37 After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in September 1980, Iran
targeted 'Saudi Arabia's oil facilities, exports, and territory throughout the
1980s, and specifically targeted the Ras Tanurah export complex.38
The unimpeded operation of processing and export facilities at
Abqaiq and Ras Tanurah are essential to the national security of Saudi
Arabia and the United States. Should a conventional or unconventional
attack prevent the export of crude from the Ras Tanurah complex, the
export facility at Yanbu, on the Red Sea coast, is reportedly not utilized to
full capacity and is capable of exporting 4.5 million barrels per day of
crude.39 The Kingdom's current export capacity is estimated at between
14-15 million barrels per day.40

Section 2: The Importance of Internal Security

Although this research focuses on Saudi Arabia's security policy to
counter a foreign threat to its national security interests, a brief discussion
of the criticality of internal security and stability is included to highlight the
challenges posed to the Kingdom's national security interests by
unconventional threats.41 In addition to protecting the country from
foreign invasion, maintaining 'the domestic stability of the Al-Saud' is
Saudi Arabia's secondary foreign policy objective. 42 Although the Iranian
unconventional threat to Saudi Arabia's internal security and stability has
remained constant unlike the fractured spiral dynamics of the
conventional threat, the Iranian Islamic Revolution remains the common
source for both threats. 43 The Iranian government explicitly challenged
the legitimacy of the Saudi Arabian government, incited the Saudi Shi'a in
the oil-producing Persian Gulf regime to revolt against their government,
and utilized the annual Hajj to disseminate anti-Saudi propaganda. 4445
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Although Iran appears to have a b a n d o n e d its practice of overtly inciting
Shi'a elements of the Saudi population, which constitute an estimated 6%
of the Saudi population, to revolt against their government and using the
Hajj to attack the House of Saud, evidence continues to highlight Iran's
involvement to subvert governments in the region by aiding internal
opposition groups. 46 Iran directed the June 1996 bombing of Khobar
Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in the Eastern Province, which
killed 19 U.S. servicemen. 47
The internal security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
dominance of the House of Saud as the Kingdom's governors is of utmost
importance to the United States.48 'For decades, the basis of state-society
relations has been the provision of goods and services by the state to
society, with little but political loyalty expected in return.' 49 Saudi Arabia is
a rentier state that remains highly dependant on its petroleum resources
for revenue. 50 Oil revenue accounts for approximately 90% of total export
earnings, 75% of state budget revenue and 45% of the gross domestic
product. 51 As Saudi oil revenue steadily increased in the late 1950s, 'oil
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money c a m e to supplement, and then to supplant, Wahhabism as the
glue that keeps the Saudi realm together.' 52 Saudi oil policy, therefore,
'has to provide the government with the money necessary to support the
system of social services, government employment, and security spending
that undergirds the regime.' 53
The Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals, which consists of
members of the Al-Saud, industry leaders, and government ministers,
formulates Saudi Arabia's petroleum policy. 54 Kenneth Pollack describes
the Al-Saud Dynasty, governors of Saudi Arabia, as 'the ideal custodians
of the world's largest oil reserves and (at most times) the largest
percentage of global oil exports' because they 'just really want to make
money.' 55 The House of Saud 'understand that their oil wealth can keep
their subjects happy and themselves living like princes for many decades'
and therefore have a long-term interest in maintaining moderate oil
pricing. 56 The western reaction to the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which
Riyadh participated in, defined Saudi Arabia's long-term strategy as a
moderate, reliable producer. 57 Saudi Arabian decision makers realized
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that threats to curtail exports to the United States, their primary market,
only accelerated efforts to increase efficiency and create alternative
sources of energy. 58 As a result, through conservation and research into
alternative sources of energy, the United States reduced dependence on
Saudi Arabian crude, thereby threatening the House of Saud's long-term
outlook of maintaining dependency on crude exports to afford
themselves and their citizens a comfortable lifestyle.59 Afterwards the
Saudis d e c i d e d 'that they would never do something so foolish again, a
position they have kept to ever since.' 60 Saudi Arabia's oil policy 'has thus
regained the central role it held in the 1930s and 1940s for regime security
as the vital source of revenue for the government.' 61
Saudi Arabia must also counter the unconventional threat to its key
oil processing a n d export facilities. 'In December 2004, Usama bin Ladin
explicitly called for attacks on oil facilities in the Persian Gulf and Caspian
Sea-including on civilians working at these facilities.' 62 Bin Laden believes
the unequal distribution of oil wealth has resulted in 'political and social
corruption in the 'Umma (the Islamic Community). 63 Bin Laden has
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promised to increase the price of oil should his Islamist movement come to
power in Saudi Arabia to a 'fair' level; 'There is little reason to think that
what bin Laden considers fair would not prove disastrous for the global
economy.' 6 4 Pollack also mentions that more extreme Islamist movements
might a d o p t the position of Khomeini and entirely shut-off the flow of
Saudi Arabian oil, instantly removing 11-13% of the global oil supply, with
even more disastrous consequences to the global economy. 65
In addition to dire economic consequences, Kenneth Pollack
argues that a successful attempt to overthrow the House of Saud would
pose catastrophic implications for regional security and stability and the
effects of regime change would be graver than those of the Iranian
Islamic Revolution. 66 The Al-Saud have a long-term strategy of
maintaining temperate oil-pricing and have 'generally allowed market
forces to prevail and at times have even used their excess production
capacity to maintain an orderly market.' 67 After the 1979 Iranian Islamic
Revolution, believing Iran's oil wealth resulted in problems ranging from
'cultural corruption of Iranian society to Western intervention in Iranian
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politics,' under Khomeini's directive, Iranian oil production dropped from
5.9 million barrels per day in 1978 to 1.3 million barrels per day in 1980.68
The impact of Khomeini's policy 'crippled the Iranian economy and
caused the worst recession in post-World War II U.S. history.'69 Pollack
argues a 'Saudi Khomeini' who pursued the same policy 'could do far
worse damage.' 70 So important are the Al-Saud to the national security of
the United States that should a serious internal rebellion or uprising occur
within Saudi Arabia, Pollack believes the United States will act militarily to
protect the authority of the House of Saud.71
The National Guard is the means the House of Saud uses to secure
'the domestic stability of the Al-Saud regime.'72 The Guard is also
responsible for protecting Saudi oil facilities against unconventional
attacks.73 A paramilitary organization, the Guard consists of 75,000
soldiers and an additional 25,000 tribal reserves, and is equipped with an
assortment of armored personnel carriers, light infantry fighting vehicles,
and towed artillery pieces to defeat unconventional threats.74 In
November 2007, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of an Industrial
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Security Force for additional protection of its oil facilities against an
unconventional attack.75 Currently at 9,000 members, the Industrial
Security Force is expected to grow by 8,000 soldiers per year to 32,000.76
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Section 3: The Capabilities of Air Power

The Royal Saudi Air Force is the primary means Saudi Arabia uses to
secure the primary foreign policy objective, protecting the country from
foreign domination and/or invasion.' 77 Measured in terms of land area,
at 829,780 square miles, or slightly larger than one-fifth the land area of
the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the 13th largest
sovereign state in the world. 78 Its overall climate is harsh and
characterized by large extremes in temperature differences. 79
Uninhabitable, sandy desert constitutes nearly half of the country's land
area; only 1.67% of the land area is classified as arable. 80 Frequent dust
and sand storms are a constant occurrence and their severity inhibits land
transportation. 81
Nadav Safran argues 'the constraints of vast space and scarce
manpower' are two constraints the House of Saud must overcome in
defending their state. 82 Raymond Hinnebusch details Saudi Arabia's
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principle vulnerability as a 'function of its large sparsely settled territory,
with long, difficult-to-defend borders.' 83 J.E. Peterson argues the size of
the state and length of Saudi Arabia's frontiers further precludes 'reliance
on land-based defense nearly impossible, even if it were not for the
manpower restrictions f a c e d by the Kingdom.' 84 Kathleen Mclnnis offers a
similar assessment, detailing 'the sheer size of Saudi Arabia coupled with
its small population renders the physical defense of its territory extremely
difficult.'85
Given the challenging geographic conditions, it is little surprise that
since the 1920s, when the House of Saud, the dynastic rulers of Saudi
Arabia, witnessed Royal Air Force aircraft pursue and destroy Ikhwan
warriors d e e p into the desert, they have 'been immensely impressed by
the capabilities of air power and have viewed it as the key to their
defense problems' and have desired 'to create a credible military
deterrence based on the strength of the Royal Saudi Air Force.' 86 The
House of Saud desires the RSAF to be the foremost element of their foreign
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security strategy and seeks the force to be 'realistically dominated by
Saudi princes' and loyal recruits.87
Saudi Arabia has chosen to protect its national security interests
against a conventional Iranian air attack with a sophisticated air defense
network. Saudi Arabia's strategy for internal and external defense has its
roots in a 1974 field survey conducted by the Department of Defense.88
The survey, implemented over a 10-year time span, specified the 'defense
of the Kingdom's oil resources, facilities, and transit routes against external
attacks' as the primary objective to be defended by a highly capable air
defense network centered around Dhahran.89 The same survey specified
the deployment of the Army to military cities constructed at 'great
expense' to the Kingdom's sparsely settled frontier regions, in close
proximity to foreign overland access routes, and the deployment of the
National Guard to protect oil installations in the Eastern Province, within
the urban regions, as well as to form a barrier between the Army and the
Al-Saud powerbase in the Najd central region.90
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Section 4: Theory Justification

Robert Jervis's article Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
discusses the effects of uncertainty and arms acquisitions by states that
may lead to armed conflict between them. The theory posits that states
are uncertain of the motives behind other states' acquisition of weapons,
tend to focus on the capabilities of these weapons rather than on the
intent to use them, and consequently are threatened by their arming.
Motivated by fear and uncertainty, the state is likely to react and acquire
additional arms 'not because they are contemplating aggression, but
because they fear attack from the first state.' 91
Jervis defines this situation as a security dilemma, which may exist
when 'many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security
decrease the security of others.' 92 The security dilemma is characterized
by an action-reaction competition between states, the outcome of which
may leave states with a greater quantity of arms but decreased overall
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security. Since states concentrate on the capabilities rather than the
intent to use them, when one state arms the other is compelled to
achieve at least a similar level of capability to achieve parity. The
continual action-reaction process sets up a spiral dynamic that may trend
towards a 'zero-sum' game unless the spiral is interrupted. According to
Jervis, states that do not understand how the security dilemma operates,
and who engage in arms competition may find themselves 'if not in a
war, then at least in a relationship of higher conflict than is required by the
objective situation.'93
The theory discussion will concentrate on 'subjective security
requirements,' which may set off 'spirals of hostility' between states. The
theory is utilized to explore Saudi Arabia's security policy in order to
evaluate whether there are any negative implications to the Kingdom's
massive military acquisitions, as the theory suggests. In order to assess a
net increase or decrease in security, Saudi Arabia's capabilities must be
compared to the capabilities of a specific adversary, in this case Iran.

In the discussion of offensive versus defensive weapons, Jervis is
utilizing the concept of capabilities. Expanding on Jervis' theory, Charles
L. Glaser defines capabilities as 'the state's ability to perform military
missions, not to the size of its forces or its total military assets.'94 The
capability definition, however, is only useful to assess an increase or
decrease in foreign security when compared to the capabilities of a
specific adversary.
The Saudi Arabian government has acquired amongst the most
sophisticated weapons systems produced by American and Western
European manufacturers. A report issued by the Congressional Research
Service dated August 18, 1982 asserts the transfer of the most
sophisticated weapons systems in the American military's arsenal are
generally restricted to NATO members and major industrial allies.95 The
same report declares 'only seven Third World countries appear to be
receiving U.S. weapons of similar sophistication,' stating Saudi Arabia ranks
second behind Israel in terms of total sophistication.96 Examples of
sophisticated aircraft acquired include F-15C/D air superiority aircraft in
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1979; the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the
KE-3A aerial refueling aircraft, and F-15C/D upgrades in 1981; Tornado air
superiority and strike aircraft in 1985 and 1988; multi-role F-15S aircraft in
1992; finally the multi-role Eurofighter Typhoon, deliveries expected to start
in late 2008.97
Saudi Arabia has also expended massive financial outlays to create
and maintain a defense establishment. From the time period from 1972 to
1988, Saudi Arabia's military expenditures accounted for 17% of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), the highest it has spent on defense
expenditures.98 From 1950 to 1997, the Kingdom spent approximately
$93.8 billion in defense expenditures from the United States alone,
although only 21% of this figure accounted for 'lethal equipment;' 32%,
the largest portion, went towards support services, and 19% for the
construction of bases and facilities.99 The highest defense spending for
equipment purchases occurred between 1985 and 1992, during the
context of the Iran-Iraq Conflict, when Riyadh signed weapons transfer
agreements worth $63.6 billion, an average of $6.5 in annual transfers,
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which represented nearly 19% of all acquisitions by the developing
world.100 Defense expenditures for 2005, the most recent figures available,
indicate the Kingdom is tied with Qatar the world's 2nd foremost spender
of defense expenditures, which account for 10% of the Kingdom's GDP.101
Conclusion

The ability of the House of Saud to protect Saudi Arabia's petroleum
infrastructure from an attack, foreign or domestic should be of concern to
states that depend on crude oil for their energy needs. Since the House
of Saud determine the Kingdom's petroleum policy, permit market forces
to determine the pricing of crude, and are committed to a long-term
strategy of reliably supplying crude to world markets, it is imperative to the
global economy that they maintain control of the state.
Long-term forecasts indicate pressure on oil exporting states to
increase crude oil production is expected to increase as global crude oil
consumption is projected to increase by 50% from 2005 to 2030.102 Since
the Persian Gulf states have the greatest actual and potential capacity to
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increase crude oil production, global reliance on Persian Gulf oil is
expected to increase from 27% in 2007 to 35% by 2030.103 Because of its
massive crude reserves, production, expansion, and export capacity,
Saudi Arabia is expected to encounter increasing pressure to increase
production commensurate with global demand.104

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY POLICY AND CAPABILITIES

One area where Jervis' theory does not seem to apply concerns
the presence of an 'international sovereign.' In the Persian Gulf, the
United States, an important element of Saudi Arabia's security policy,
serves as the regional hegemon, extends conventional and nuclear
deterrence, a n d is the foremost supplier of a d v a n c e d weaponry to the
Saudis.105 The United States deems the security of Saudi Arabian oilfields
to be a vital American national security interest and has demonstrated its
intent to protect the oilfields during three crises; in the mid 1960s during
the Egyptian c a m p a i g n in Yemen, after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
Conflict in 1980, and during the First Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 J 0 6
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution defined Saudi Arabia's security
policy which capitalizes on the capabilities of air power to provide a

security umbrella over the Kingdom. Formerly dependant on Iran for
security of its northern and eastern territories, as well as the Persian Gulf
coastal waters, which includes the oil producing areas, the emergence of
a hostile threat after the Islamic Revolution in close proximity to vulnerable
facilities and population centers compelled the Saudis to acquire an air
defense capability to safeguard their national security assets.107
Saudi Arabia's air defense capability, regarded as one of the most
advanced air defense networks outside of the NATO arena, is the primary
means the Kingdom utilizes to secure its national security assets from a
foreign air attack.108 An overall assessment finds the air forces of the
Persian Gulf states as far superior to that of Iran.109 In regards to the
capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran, a recent military analyst declares
that 'despite the manpower imbalance between forces, Arab Gulf states
are better equipped to damage Iran and resist counter-strikes.'110 Iran has
conceded defeat in the realm of air power capabilities, decided that
reinvestment in their air power capabilities is futile, and is instead pursuing
a program to indigenously produce medium range ballistic missiles.111

Section 1: Security Policy

Pre-1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution

Robert Jervis theorizes that in the international system, due to the
absence of an 'international sovereign,' an 'institution or authority that
can make a n d enforce international laws,' states are not mandated to
cooperate in order to peacefully resolve disputes.112 This aspect of Jervis'
theory does not readily conform to the Persian Gulf, however, as the
region has witnessed the intermittent presence of a regional hegemon
since the United Kingdom sponsored a 'maritime truce' in 1835.113 The
premise of the treaty amongst Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the Trucial
Sheikhdoms (currently the United Arab Emirates) and the United Kingdom
recognized London as regional mediator and security provider.114 The
presence of the British also tempered Ibn Saud's expansionist ambitions
towards the smaller coastal states, with many Saudis believing 'they would
be ruling over the entire peninsula today.' 115 In January 1968 the United
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Kingdom announced its intent to depart the Persian Gulf area and cease
providing security by the end of 1971.116
Iran's central geographic location within the region, coastline that
spans the entire length of the Persian Gulf, abundant petroleum resources,
and 'old a n d territorially established civilization' are four principle factors
contributing towards Iran's long-standing foreign policy characteristic of
'the drive towards regional supremacy.' 117 Iran's perception as a 'natural'
state in the Middle East, 'uniquely qualified to determine, at the very least,
the destiny of the Gulf subregion,' furthers Iran's belief that it 'can and
should have influence beyond its borders.' 118 Claiming Iran's 'historic
responsibilities,' Shah Reza Pahlavi promptly volunteered to function as
the primary regional security provider as proposed by Nixon's 'Twin Pillars'
policy in 1969.119
Saudi Arabia's security policy in the 1970s is characterized by its
dependence on Iran as a foreign security provider. Under the Shah, in the
1970s Iran 'embarked on the largest military buildup in the region' with
assistance from the United States for military hardware, training, and
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support services.120 In cooperation with American defense corporations
Northrop, Bell, and Vickers, in the early 1970s the Shah initiated programs
to natively produce 'helicopters, aircraft, guided missiles, electronics, and
tanks.'121 For nearly one decade, with Washington's and Riyadh's
approval, Iran provided security for Saudi Arabia's northern and eastern
frontiers, including the oil producing areas and tanker transit routes
through the Straight of Hormuz.122
Saudi Arabia's reliance on Iran for security in thel970s permitted the
initiation of programs for internal development. Declared unified by Ibn
Saud in 1932, the Saudis had 'overwhelming work to do at home' after the
initiation of the First Five-Year Development Plan, a comprehensive
strategy to develop the Kingdom's social services, organize and develop
the government, and construct infrastructure, which were essentially nonexistent until the initiation of First Five-Year Plan.123
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Post 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution Security Policy
Saudi Arabia's security problems with Iran originate with the 1979
Iranian Islamic Revolution, which defined Saudi Arabia's domestic and
foreign security policy. The 'Twin Pillars' policy collapsed after the 1979
Iranian Islamic Revolution and altered Iran's status from Saudi Arabia's
'strategic shield to a major threat' in the Persian Gulf.124
Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve its sovereignty in the Middle East by
avoiding international isolation and balancing with regional states to
prevent the emergence of a strong regional hegemon.125 Within the
Arabian Peninsula, which the Kingdom perceives as its sphere of
influence, Saudi Arabia tends to adopt a hegemonic role amongst the
smaller GCC states, who generally defer to Saudi leadership.126
Iran's political system in the post revolutionary period is
characterized by factionalism, fragmentation, institutional competition,
and consists of hard-liners, nationalists, and pragmatists.127 Iran's long
term objective in the Middle East is to replace American hegemony.128

Pollack argues 'convincing the Iranian regime to give up its most radical,
anti-status quo policies is going to be very difficult,' believing the hardliners will not agree to more moderate policies.129 The hard-liners
constitute a powerful faction of the government, c o m m a n d the loyalty of
the military, promote an aggressive, anti-American, anti-status quo foreign
policy, and oppose 'any accommodation with the United States and our
allies in the region (from Saudi Arabia to Egypt to Israel).'130 On July 8,
2008, an aid to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, threatened
to 'burn Tel Aviv and American ships in the Gulf, and strike at America's
vital interests around the globe' if it were attacked. 1 3 1 Earlier in 2008 Iran
threatened to retaliate for military strikes on its suspected nuclear
enrichment facilities by 'closing the Straight of Hormuz, the passage for
roughly 40% of the world's traded oil, and striking at neighbouring
countries.' 132
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Section 2: The U.S. Role in Saudi Arabian Security

The United States features prominently in Saudi Arabia's security
policy and functions as the regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf.133 The
defense of the Persian Gulf oilfields have been a foremost priority for the
United States military since President Carter declared the Persian Gulf as
'a vital American interest during his 1980 presidential address;' successive
American administrations have a d o p t e d similar policies towards Saudi
Arabia. 134 In the 1980s and 1990s the U.S. achieved its strategic objectives
of reaching agreements permitting access to naval bases and airfields,
the prepositioning of military supplies, joint training exercises, and the
transfer of military equipment with several GCC states.135 The foremost
U.S. objective of 'Pax Americana', the new world order, centered on
securing 'unconstrained access to Gulf oil at "acceptable prices."136
Although there is no formal defense treaty between the two states, since
the 1950s Washington has unofficially guaranteed Riyadh's security
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against external and internal threats and is the foremost supplier of hightechnology weaponry.137 The basis of security cooperation between
Washington and Riyadh is a February 15, 1951 U.S. State Department
policy brief that represented a 'definitive statement of American policy
on, and aspirations for, the Kingdom and the House of Saud,' the majority
of policies and guidance remain in effect.138
The Islamic Revolution marked the initiation of the United States as a
regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf. In February 1979 U.S. Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown 'pledged support for the kingdom against external
threats, and proposed to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia to assist in its
defense.'139 In October 1980, shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
conflict, Washington deployed four AWACS early-detection aircraft to
monitor hostilities between the two states which served as an intermediate
solution until 1986 when the first RSAF AWACS aircraft arrived following the
October 1981 AWACS agreement.140
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U.S. -Extended Conventional Deterrence
The United States extended conventional deterrence and
established its credibility during four crises. During the Yemen conflict
Washington signaled its broad willingness to 'intervene militarily if
necessary to protect the Kingdom and secure the oil fields' as well as
support the House of Saud from internal threats arising from the conflict.141
As part of Operation Hardsurface, six U.S. Air Force F-lOODs were deployed
to Dhahran in July 1963 after the outbreak of the Yemen conflict to deter
Egyptian air attacks in the Eastern Province.142 In February 1979 U.S.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 'pledged support for the kingdom
against external threats, and proposed to base U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
to assist in its defense.'143 The next month the United States offered to
send armed F-l 5 Eagle interceptors to the Kingdom in response to
hostilities between North and South Yemen.144 Washington also deployed
AW ACS aircraft to Riyadh to monitor the border war between the two
Yemens in 1979, which remained in the Kingdom after the Iranian
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Revolution a n d Iran-Iraq Conflict. 145 The aircraft remained in the Kingdom
until the RSAF AWACS and air defense network b e c a m e operational in
1986.146
Due to domestic pressure and the rise of militant Islamic extremism
within the Kingdom it is highly unlikely the U.S. will station a large
contingent of forces on Saudi soil.147 The House of Saud perceives the
presence of large contingents of foreign troops as more a liability than an
asset, as it undermines the legitimacy of their regime. 148 To support
conventional deterrence, the U.S. maintains rapid-deployment power
projection capabilities and a number of large bases in Europe. (USAF
European C o m m a n d Headquarters at Mildenhall, United Kingdom; US
Army Europe Headquarters at Heidelberg, Germany; USAF 16th Air Force
at Aviano, Italy; USAF 16th Air Force at Incirlik, Turkey; US Navy 5th Fleet in
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; US Navy 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean
Sea).149
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U.S.-Extended Nuclear Deterrence150
The U.S. nuclear umbrella serves is a necessary deterrent due to the
massive size of Iran's manpower resources; Army, 350,000; Reserve Army,
350,000; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 125,000, Paramilitary, 40,000;
Basij Resistance Force/Paramilitary militia, between 1,000,000 to
2,500,000.151 Furthermore, Iran has further demonstrated its ability to
assemble large contingents of ground forces 'at short notice when it feels
that its vital interests are threatened.'152
Iran's ability to absorb sustained damage over a prolonged period
of time further necessitates U.S-extended nuclear deterrence.153 The
Iranians are 'military professionals' who have gained valuable experience
from their eight-year conflict with Iraq and closely observed the American
military involvement with Iraq.154 Saudi Arabia cannot utilize its primary
strike aircraft, the F-15S, without extensive U.S. logistical and material
support, thereby limiting the ability to deter Iran by threat of severe
retalliation.155
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Section 3: Saudi Arabian and Iranian Fixed-Wing Capabilities

Saudi Arabian Capabilities

The Saudi Arabian Peace Shield is a highly a d v a n c e d network of 80
air defense radars, consisting of long-range air surveillance radars, missile
defense radars, a n d five E-3A AW ACS aircraft. 156 Peace Shield is a means
to integrate, coordinate, and control airborne, ground, and naval
resources in real-time. 157 Peace Shield air defense capabilities are
optimized for 'defense-in-depth' against combat aircraft and cruise
missiles and are considered one of the most a d v a n c e d air defense
networks outside the NATO arena. 158 The system is arranged in three
layers, to provide redundant coverage of outer, intermediate, and
immediate distances from the Dhahran area. 159
For outer, intermediate, and immediate periphery defenses, Saudi
Arabia operates 27 F-15S Eagles optimized for interception missions, 66 F15C Eagles a n d 18 F-15D Eagles.160 The F-15C/Ds are equipped with
Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs) that increase mission endurance time by 65%
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to 93% depending on the mission profile.161 The RSAF operates 7 Boeing
KE-3A tankers a n d 8 KC-130H Hercules aerial refueling aircraft. 162
Saudi Arabia's strike aircraft include 43 multi-role F-15S and 75
Panavia Tornado Interdictor/Strike (IDS) aircraft. 163 Contrary to initial plans
at the time of its sale in December 1992, Washington imposed no
restrictions or limitations to the offensive capabilities of the F-15S.164 In the
wake of budget cuts which affected its overall capability following the
First Persian Gulf Conflict, the RSAF has improved its readiness, combat
effectiveness, joint warfare, and cooperation with other services; the RSAF
is further improving its 'readiness, training, and maintenance' to the level
of effectively exploiting its resources.165
For interception of aircraft and missiles in the intermediate and
immediate vicinity, the Air Defense Forces operate 16 batteries of Patriot
Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) air defense missiles and 16 batteries of
Improved-Hawk (l-Hawk) air defense missiles.166
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Iranian Air Capabilities

Iran operates a network of air surveillance radars but coverage of
the entire state is believed to be severely deficient. 167 Tehran is
attempting to develop its air defense radar network, although the results
of its efforts are unclear; the 2007 edition of The Military Balance reports a
denial issued by Ukraine regarding transfer of the Kolchuga, a radar
system with a reported range of 370 miles.168
The Iranian Air Force is a mix of 281 American, Western European,
Russian, a n d Chinese c o m b a t aircraft, mostly sourced during the reign of
the Shah in the 1960s and 1970s, a n d now a g e d , mostly obsolete, and of a
low serviceability level. 169 The IISS deems serviceability levels of Iran's
aircraft at 60% for American and West European warplanes and 80% for
Russian and Chinese models. 170 The ordinance supplied for American and
Western European aircraft include a stock of some 3,000 AGM-65
Maverick air-to-surface missile and AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, but
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due to their age and environmental storage conditions reliability of the
missiles' electrical and propulsion components are low.171
Similar to its combat aircraft, Iran's current SAM inventory consists of
a mix of Western and Russian systems, also mostly obsolete.172 Iran is
reportedly attempting to procure the Russian S-300/SA-20 SAM system,
although the system does not appear the Military Balance 2008
inventory.173 In 2007 Iran reportedly received 29 SA-15 Guideline and 10
Pantsyr air defense systems.174
Iran has chosen not to reconstruct its air force. The Iranian leaders
are aware of the 'overwhelming air superiority of potential new
adversaries,' and believe their overall air defense and air strike
capabilities have degraded to the point that investment in them would
be futile, and are instead pursing a program of military self-sufficiency.175
Although Iran has the ability to acquire new aircraft, developments to
improve its air power capabilities are minimal, and funding to develop an
indigenous combat aircraft is low.176 The 2001-2002 Military Balance
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predicted Iran would purchase the Su-27 or Su-30 aircraft; however the
type is not listed in the 2008 Military Balance.177

Conclusion
The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution defined Saudi Arabia's security
policy, shifting the Kingdom away from complete reliance on a foreign
power towards greater security independence. The Kingdom's strategy
to protect its national security assets depends on an air defense capability
that can quickly detect, identify, and intercept a hostile aircraft. The
strategy is not completely independent, however, as Riyadh depends on
Washington to train, service, supply its armed forces, and function as the
security provider for Saudi Arabia's foreign and domestic security.178
Iran is aware of the superiority of Saudi Arabia's air power
capabilities and the inferiority of their own air power capabilities and have
decided that reinvestment in them is futile. Iran's strategy to regain its
military strength is the pursuit of an independent ballistic missile program,
which sets up the current pattern of spiral dynamics between Iran and the
six GCC states.179
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CHAPTER 3

SPIRAL DYNAMICS

An important element Jervis contends is necessary to evaluate
whether states can formulate compatible security policies is the concept
of subjective security requirements. Security policies that mandate high
security requirements to gain increments of security increase the
probability of downwards 'spirals of hostility,' thereby reducing the
probability of formulating compatible security policies.180
As a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and conflict with Iraq,
Iran's fixed-wing air capabilities have degraded to the point that Iran's
military leadership no longer believes investment in them is cost
effective.181 Consequently Iran believes an indigenous ballistic missile
production capability is essential to restoring its military strength.182

In a clear reflection of the expected outcome of Jervis' theory, a
greater quantity of arms but overall decreased levels of security, arms
acquisitions between Iran and the GCC states appears to indicate an
increasingly developing downward spiral of hostility between the two
sides. In response to Iran's first successful test of a ballistic missile in 1998,
shortly afterwards, in 2000, the six GCC states initiated measures to
implement a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile defense network.
Measures taken by the GCC to ensure connectivity of all assets, from antimissile defense systems to strike aircraft are particularly noteworthy since
the five smaller Arab Persian Gulf states have historically been weary of
Saudi Arabian hegemony. In addition, planned acquisitions of additional
combat aircraft by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman
appear to suggest high subjective security requirements, especially since
the GCC air forces are assessed to have uncontested air superiority over
Iran's fixed-wing air capabilities.

Section 1: The First Spiral

The first spiral occurred after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq Conflict in
September 1980. The Conflict 'dramatically altered the security
environment on Saudi Arabia's eastern shores.'183 With no early warning
capabilities, Saudi Arabian facilities and population centers, 150 miles
across the Persian Gulf from Iranian airbases at Busheir, 'presented an
easy and inviting target' which could be struck 'with virtually no warning'
from Iranian strike aircraft in as little as 16 minutes.184 The flat topography
and low terrain prevalent in the Eastern Province provides little in the way
of geographical protection. 185 The Saudis perceived their coastal and
inland hydrocarbon processing and export facilities as too vulnerable to
an Iranian air attack, and voiced broad concern for the safety of their
crude oil tankers transiting through the Straight of Hormuz.186
As the Conflict escalated, the Kingdom expressed 'unprecedented
concern' with protecting its Eastern Province facilities and population
centers on the Persian Gulf from an Iranian air attack. 187 Throughout the

course of the conflict, Iran threatened 'Saudi Arabia's oil facilities, exports,
and territory throughout the 1980s, and specifically targeted Ras Tanurah,
the primary maritime export facility for Saudi Arabian crude.188 In 1984
Iranian aircraft struck Saudi crude oil tankers in Persian Gulf waters.189
The first spiral is marked by a series of acquisitions by Saudi Arabia to
construct a sophisticated early warning network to reduce the likelihood
of a successful Iranian air attack on its coastal petroleum facilities and
population centers. Iran constructed its military under the Shah with
extensive American assistance, and therefore the requisite capabilities to
strike Saudi Arabia were in place when a hostile Iran emerged after the
Islamic Revolution.190 A quid-pro-quo process, therefore, does not mark
the first spiral, where one side reacts to developments the other side is
pursuing. The air defense agreement signed in October 1981 included
five E-3A Sentry AWACS, 18 ground based radars, 8 KE-3A aerial refueling
tankers, conformal fuel tanks and AIM-9L Sidewinders for F-15s, and the
construction of support facilities.191 In September 1985 Riyadh signed the
first phase of the Al-Yamamah (the Dove) Agreement with London, initially

valued at $5 billion, which included the a d v a n c e d Tornado IDS strike
aircraft. 192

Termination of the First Spiral

The 1979 Islamic Revolution aborted the spiral by inhibiting Iran's
ability to c o m p e t e with Saudi Arabia in a mutual action-reaction process.
At the time of the Islamic Revolution, programs initiated by the Shah in
cooperation with American defense corporations to indigenously
produce military hardware were incomplete, American military advisors
departed, and ties with the United States severed. 193 The Tehran hostage
crisis resulted in Iran's international isolation through 'general
condemnation, hostile UNSC resolutions, US-engineered economic
sanctions a n d the seizure of Iranian assets.'194 Rachael Bronson describes
the effects of 'Operation Staunch,' Washington's strategy to pressure
partners a n d allies to stem the flow of weapons to Iran and Iraq, to Iran's
military as 'particularly deleterious.' 195 Although directed towards both
Iran and Iraq, in practice Washington applied 'significantly more effort' to

cease the flow of weapons to Iran than Iraq.196 Kenneth Pollack assess
the effects of the Islamic Revolution 'crippled' the Iranian military after
Washington severed military cooperation and American military advisors
departed, further assessing that military 'has never regained the strength it
once had.' 197 The eight-year conflict between Iran and Iraq reduced the
strength of Iran's conventional forces by 50-60%, and 'significant wear
from harsh climate conditions and insufficient funding further deteriorated
its military.'198
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Section 2: The Second Spiral

Iran's Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Program

The second spiral is the result of Iran's inability to compete with the
GCC states immediately after the Islamic Revolution. A direct result of the
Islamic Revolution, the term 'Khod kafaye (self-sufficiency) refers to Iran's
'deep desire to reduce its economic dependence on Western powers
and outside economic forces.'199 To counter the negative effects of the
Islamic Revolution on their military, the Iranians initiated military
cooperation with North Korea.200 The IISS theorizes the effects of
international sanctions left Iran with little choice but to initiate a path of
independent production capabilities.201 The partnership with North Korea
evolved to the field of ballistic missile development, whereby in exchange
for providing missile components, North Korea received data from Iranian
test flights.202
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Iran's leaders believe achieving an independent missile production
capability is a central element to restoring their military strength.203 Over
the past 20 years Iran has steadily progressed towards an independent
research, development, and production capability of a broad variety of
military products, including cruise and medium-range ballistic missiles.204
Iran's military industry currently produces nearly 2,000 defense proucts and
exports to over 30 countries.205
Iran's strategic missiles are under the command of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force, and consists of one brigade of six
single launchers, each with fourShahab-3 (Meteor) medium-range
ballistic missiles, Iran's most advanced medium-range ballistic missile, and
one brigade of Shahab 1 /2 with 12-18 launchers.206 The Shahab-3A/M,
also known as the Ghadr-101, has an estimated range of 1,050 miles,
allowing Iran to deploy the missile at any point in the state and strike the
Dhahran area.207 Western sources estimate the payload of the Shahab-3
at 2,204 pounds and do not believe Iran's ballistic missiles currently have
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capability.208 The IISS

estimates Iran is capable of producing 10 Shahab-3 medium range
ballistic missiles per year.209 Iran's latest advance in medium-range
ballistic missile technology is the successful test in November 2008 of
advanced semi-solid fuel propulsion systems that increases the declared
range of the Shahab to over 1,250 miles.210

GCC Cooperation to Improve Anti-Missile Capabilities

In what appears to be a clearly defined 'quo' reaction to the threat
presented by Iran's ballistic missiles, the GCC states are increasing
interoperability of their air defense network in order to improve antiballistic missile defense capabilities.2" Although the elements are not yet
entirely in place, the spiral appears to be approaching the point of full
development; only when the GCC anti-ballistic missile components are
actually acquired and deployed to their territory can the spiral be
considered as developed.
The strategy of increasing and improving collective air defense
capabilities is particularly interesting because of the historical friction
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between the GCC states and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia perceives the
Arabian Peninsula as its 'natural sphere of influence,' and until the Iranian
Revolution and Iran-Iraq Conflict, the GCC states 'resisted formal
acknowledgement of Riyadh's leadership role' and have been as weary
of Saudi Arabian as Iranian hegemony.212 The GCC states have been
discussing increasing the size of 'Peninsula Shield, ' formed in 1986, from
5,000 soldiers to at least 25,000 soldiers since December 2000.213 In
November 2007 the GCC states once again discussed increasing the size
of 'Peninsula Shield' to 22,000 soldiers and implementation of a jointcommand structure.214 To date the enlargement of 'Peninsula Shield' has
not occurred.
In contrast to discussions to expand 'Peninsula Shield,' the GCC has
made substantial improvements in the realm of anti-missile defense
capabilities. In December 2001 the six GCC states established a system,
'Hizam al Taawun' (Cooperation Belt) to integrate their early warning air
defense radar for broader coverage along the Persian Gulf.215 According
to Lieutenant General Staff Pilot Prince Abdul Rahman Bin Fahed Al-Faisal,
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Commander of the Royal Saudi Air Force, the objective is to interconnect
member states with digital data links 'to commonly recognize air targets,
and to distribute the relevant missions amongst their respective national
Air Force and air defense assets.216 The IISS predicts the system can
simultaneously track several hundred targets and is being developed to
provide early warnings of ballistic and cruise missile launches.217 The
premise behind the system is to allow each state to acquire radar
information from the other states, providing broad area coverage from
Egypt to Oman, and permit command-and-control decisions made in
one state to serve as a master decision for the other states.218 Lieutenant
General Staff Pilot Prince Al-Faisal further emphasizes the need for the
GCC states to 'improve the system's swiftness in performance, and to add
the technical requirements necessary to enable the member states of the
Gulf Council getting the highest level of coordination between their
operations centres.'219
Major General Mohammed bin Saed Al-Qamzi, the United Arab
Emirates Air Force Commander, deems a major priority of the U.A.E.
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armed forces is to improve anti-ballistic missile capabilities to deter the
threat posed by ballistic missiles.220 Similar to Saudi Arabia's strategy, the
U.A.E. is pursing a layered defense strategy and fielding multiple
systems.221 In September 2008 the U.A.E. announced its intent to acquire
the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot PAC-3 air
defense systems, two American systems designed specifically to intercept
ballistic missile.222 The UAE is the first foreign state to acquire the THAAD,
the most advanced terminal area anti-ballistic missile system.223 The
United Arab Emirates is expected to network the THAAD into Hizam al
Taawun, giving personnel in any GCC state command and control ability
to launch an anti-ballistic missile missile deployed in the U.A.E. to intercept
a ballistic missile converging on any GCC state.224
The principle question Jervis seeks to answer is whether states can
adopt compatible security policy, meaning 'can one state construct
security policy that will not inadvertently threaten another state?' Jervis
notes 'decision makers act in terms of vulnerability they feel, which can
differ from the actual situation' and introduces the concept of subjective

security requirements as 'the price they are willing to pay to gain
increments of security.'225 If a state places a premium on their security,
they are likely to 'be sensitive to even minimal threats, and to demand
high levels of arms, which 'run the danger of setting off spirals of arms
races and hostility.'226

Subjective Security Requirements
Indicative of high subjective security requirements, the GCC states
are acquiring additional arms beyond those necessary for anti-ballistic
missile defense. In December 2007 Kuwait announced its intent to acquire
the Patriot PAC-3.227 Saudi Arabia is also in discussions to acquire the
PAC-3.228 Saudi Arabia has also completed Link-16 communications
upgrades on its AW ACS aircraft, permitting secure, near-real time
exchanges of battlefield information.229 The U.A.E. is also acquiring 80 F-16
multi-role aircraft and pursing Link-16 data links for its existing air defense
capabilities and combat aircraft.230 Oman is also acquiring 12 F-16 multirole aircraft with Link-16 connectivity. The RSAF is acquiring 72 Eurofighter
Typhoon multirole strike fighter aircraft. As the Kingdom is reportedly keen
to receive the new aircraft, deliveries allocated to the RAF are being
diverted to the RSAF and expected to commence towards the end of
2008, continuing through 2011.231 The RSAF is also implementing the
Tornado IDS GR.4 upgrade to significantly improve covert, all-weather,

59

deep-strike capabilities of the Tornado IDS fleet.232 The aircraft are being
configured for advanced stand-off capabilities, including the Storm
Shadow air-launched cruise missile and the Brimstone anti-armor missile.233
The second dimension of subjective security involves threat
perception, 'the estimate of whether the other will cooperate.' 234 Recent
examples of cooperation between the two sides do not include any
discussions of security policy. Jervis mentions cooperation as a means to
reduce uncertainty and alleviate fear. In the realm of security
cooperation, treaties, inspection mechanisms, and mutual defense pacts
are mentioned; none of these exist to reduce fear between either sides.
In late 2008 Saudi Arabia invited Iranian President Ahmadinejad for the
annual Hajj; the GCC states invited President Ahmadinejad to attend their
annual summit meeting; on October 28 GCC Secretary-General Abdel
Rahman Attiya visited Tehran and expressed hope for 'cementing and
consolidating' relations.235 To date, however, President Ahmadinejad has
not been invited to the February 2009 meeting, and Secretary-General
Attiya compared Iran's occupation of Abu Musa, and the Greater and

Lesser Tunubs, in the Straight of Hormuz, to the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territory.236 In February 2009 Ali Akber Nateq Nouri, a
conservative high-level advisor declared Bahrain to be Iran's 14th
Province, reviving Iran's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain dating from the
14th century. 237
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Conclusion

The 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution is the source for both spirals of
hostility. Although the first spiral did not fully develop and has a clear
termination, the second spiral started in the time frame immediately
following the Islamic Revolution, as Iran sought to restore its military
strength after its international isolation. For some 20 years, therefore, some
degree of overlap between the two spirals existed until Iran commenced
testing its ballistic missiles in 1998.238 Iran's efforts to restore its military
strength through an independent medium range ballistic missile
production capability triggered the GCC reaction to acquire additional
arms, principally anti-ballistic missile systems and additional combat
aircraft. Furthermore, in a significant break from its historically limited
military cooperation, the GCC states are closely cooperating to network
their air defense assets.

CONCLUSION

Saudi Arabia's ability to protect its national security interests from
foreign and domestic threats are paramount to the stability of the global
economy. The House of Saud have demonstrated their resolve not only to
maintain the continuous flow of crude but to adhere to market pricing;
the ability of the House of Saud to defend themselves from internal
challenges should also be of paramount concern to consumers of Saudi
Arabian crude oil.239

What Parts of Jervis' Theory do not Appear to Apply?

Two areas of Jervis' theory do not apply to the case involving Saudi
Arabia's foreign security policy. First and foremost is the presence of the
United States as a regional hegemon that guarantees Saudi Arabia's
foreign security a n d internal stability. 'Pax Americana,' the United States
military presence in the Persian Gulf after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
Conflict, continues to the present time, in the form of continued arms sales
and support services to the GCC states. The rise of organized Islamic
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fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia poses the greatest threat to the
Kingdom's internal security.240 Saudi Arabia's strategy to rely on a
technologically heavy air force rather than a large conscripted army
necessitates a close, long-term relationship with the United States.
Although Saudi Arabia seeks to distance its dependence on the United
States for security due to criticism of fundamental Islamic groups, which
claim the House of Saud is deviating from purist Islamic beliefs the regime
is founded on, Saudi Arabia's dependence on the United States to supply,
train, and maintain its armed forces will only increase as technology
advances and the need for Kingdom's need to secure its vital assets
remains constant.
The second area concerns Jervis' definition of two variables of the
theory, the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation.
Jervis proposes to measure the first variable, the offense-defense balance,
by asking 'does the state have to spend more or less than one dollar on
defensive forces to offset each dollar spent by the other side on forces
that could be used to attack' and 'with a given inventory of forces, is it
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better to attack or to defend?' 241 A state has the 'offensive advantage'
when it is easier to destroy the others' military and annex territory, whereas
'defensive advantage' means it is easier to defend territory from an
attack. The offense-defense balance is of little use because Saudi
Arabia's national security assets comprise a geographically minute area;
should an adversary desire to inflict extensive damage, Abqaiq and Ras
Tanurah would be ideal targets. (Recall Iran's attempts to target Ras
Tanurah in the 1980s and the foiled attack on Abqaiq in February 2006 by
Al-Qaeda)
Utilizing the concept of offense-defense differentiation, the second
variable, is also of little value. Jervis defines differentiation as 'whether
weapons and policies that protect the state also provide the capability
for attack.' 242 Jervis questions the ability to concisely define
differentiation, conceding 'no simple and unambiguous definition is
possible and in many cases no judgment can be reached.' 243
Technological improvements commencing in the 1980s enabled aircraft
manufacturers to produce multi-role aircraft that merged the role of

offense a n d defensive capabilities. The benefit to merging defensive and
offensive capabilities is increased flexibility, reduced aircrew and support
services training, leading to decreased costs. Saudi Arabia's strategy for
external security relies on a high-technology air force; since modern
c o m b a t aircraft blur the distinction between offensive and defensive
capabilities it is difficult to apply the concept to this case.

What the Case Tells Us About Jervis' Theory

The case involving Saudi Arabia's security policy illustrates that the
general premise of the theory, states that attempt to increase their
security may inadvertently threaten others and suffer a decrease in
security, appears to apply despite the inability to use two central variables
of the theory. By deploying an a d v a n c e d air defense capability, Saudi
Arabia and the five other GCC states have removed an air attack as a
viable option for Iran to attack, compelling Iran to seek alternate means
to threaten them. The Iranian Islamic Revolution distilled in Iran the
importance of achieving an independent arms development, production,
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and maintenance capability; the Islamic Revolution terminated the first
spiral but also initiated the second spiral. Finding itself isolated and unable
to support their American-supplied Air Force after the Iranian Islamic
Revolution, Iran decided to pursue an independent ballistic missile
production capability to regain its military strength. There is no need to
utilize offense-defense balance and differentiation in this case; this case is
indicative in a more fundamental sense that states will pursue measures
they perceive as necessary to increase their security regardless of whether
these measures will inadvertently threaten other states.

What Jervis' Theory Tells Us About the Case

Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program, specifically the allegations
leveled that the objective of its nuclear enrichment program is to produce
weapons-grade uranium useful in an atomic device is certainly alarming.
As Jervis' theory expects states to continue to pursue measures to
increase their security, the nuclear developments are, however, the
logical step for Iran to pursue. Although no international verification of
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Iran's claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes has
occurred, Iran's actual behavior is inconsistent with a peaceful nuclear
program.244 Iran appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapons delivery
capability.245 One of the Iranian regime's cardinal fears is an American
invasion; in light of the rapid fall of the Iraqi regime to American forces,
Iran perceives a strong deterrent is necessary to safeguard the regime.246
Fearful that a nuclear-capable Iran will pursue an aggressive foreign
policy, other states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, may pursue
their own nuclear weapons capability as a deterrence, intensifying the
current downwards spiral.247 A nuclear-capable Iran will have profound
consequences on Saudi Arabia's foreign and internal security. Statements
from officials of GCC member states indicates their high level of concern
of a nuclear-capable Iran. An unnamed official from an declares 'If the
military option happens, we will have no problem with that,' in reference
to American or Israeli airstrikes on Iran's suspected nuclear facilities; the
same official states 'If we reach a point where the choice is living with a
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nuclear Iran or suffering the consequences of an attack, we would
choose the latter.' 248
Saudi Arabia a n d the GCC states will be compelled to react since
their air defense capabilities may not be able to defeat a determined
barrage of Iranian missiles; Iran may also chose to deliver the warhead
through unconventional means, completely bypassing conventional
delivery methods. Saudi Arabia will therefore experience additional
pressure on its internal security. Any deterrent advantage Saudi Arabia
has due to its a d v a n c e d , albeit limited airstrike capabilities may therefore
be rendered useless if Iran is declared a nuclear capable state. A readily
available option may be to enlist the services of other declared nuclear
states, namely Pakistan in order to obtain an immediate deterrent; the
Kingdom has utilized the services of the Pakistani military in the past.249
It is in the interest of all world actors to prevent an all-out nuclear
arms race in the Persian Gulf, especially states that depend on Saudi
Arabia for crude oil. To this end, as the regional hegemon and because
the United States deems the continuous flow of reasonably priced crude

oil as a vital national security interest, the United States will be compelled
to adopt a leadership position to prevent the current spiral from taking on
an atomic dimension. Unfortunately, since both sides appear intent on
adding more weapons to their arsenal, breaking the current spiral may
prove more difficult than the previous spiral.
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(Energy Information Administration, 2)
Saudi Arabian oilfields are unique due to their naturally high reservoir
pressure. The importance of naturally high reservoir pressure at Saudi
Arabian oil fields to compensate for the decline in United States
production cannot be understated; production from the Ghawar oil field,
the single largest crude oil reservoir in the world, increased from 906,000
barrels per day in 1965 to 4,653,000 barrels per day in 1974, a growth rate
unmatched by any other oil reservoir in the world. (Simmons, 48)
31
(Energy Information Administration, 10)
32
(Energy Information Administration, 6)
33
(Energy Information Administration, 6)
34
((Pollack, 16)
35
(Energy Information Administration, 8)
36
(Energy Information Administration, 6), (Pollack, 16)
37
(Energy Information Administration, 10)
3
8(Bronson, 154, 164)
39
(Energy Information Administration, 10)
40
(Energy Information Administration, 10)
41
The following is a brief verse on the relationship between state formation
and the necessity to protect its national security assets from foreign and
domestic threats.

30

Declared unified by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud on
September 23, 1932, Saudi Arabia is a relatively new state. Ibn Saud
created the modern Saudi Arabian state in the early 20th century by
conquest. (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East
States, 199) The four geographical areas of the state have 'rarely, since
the time of the Prophet Muhammad, been united under one rule' and
'retain strong senses of regional identity.' (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami,
The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 199-200) According to
Ghassane Salameh and Vivian Steir, 'the tribe has consistently provided
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the basis for social and political organization in the Arabian Peninsula.
Any attempt to increase power beyond the tribe has invariably been
based on religion.' (Salameh and Steir 1980, 5) To increase the size of his
empire, Ibn Saud drew on 'the long historical association between the AlSaud and the puritanical, reformist Islamist strain known in the West as
"Wahhabism."' (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 200) In exchange for
guarantees of security from their rivals, descendants of Muhammad ibn
Al-Wahhab afforded the Al-Saud 'an association which lifted it above
other merely tribal powers,' providing Ibn Saud with the 'ideological
justification for the expansion of Saudi rule.' (Salameh and Steir, 5)
The regionalized nature of the new Saudi empire caused many of
Ibn Saud's new subjects to be weary of Saudi hegemony. (Hinnebusch
and Ehteshami, 200) Al-Wahhab and his descendents regarded the Shi'a,
concentrated in the Al-Hasa and Qatif regions in the oil-producing Persian
Gulf region, as 'little better than unbelievers;' in the western Hijaz region,
'many Hijazis, accustomed to more liberal social mores, chafed under the
Puritanism of the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.' (Hinnebusch and
Ehteshami, 200)
The expectation for little but political loyalty in exchange for
providing a plethora of free or low-cost government services, including
security, no taxation, health care, education, loans, housing, and
employment is creating its set of growing problems. (Pollack, 81)
Accustomed to foreigners performing skilled and unskilled tasks has
created a 'crippling work culture,' whereby 'two-thirds of the workers in
the Gulf region are expatriates while much of the population is either
unemployed or does not participate in the workforce at all.' (Pollack, 8182) 2008 data from the IISS estimates expatriate workers constitute 27% of
the Saudi population. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008,
260) 2003-2004 data from unofficial sources estimated unemployment in
Saudi Arabia at between 25 to 30 percent, whereas government sources
claimed unemployment atl 3 percent. (Pollack, 75) Data from 2007
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illustrate that Saudi Arabia's population is disproportionally young (38.2%
are between the ages ot 0-14, 59.4% are between the ages of 15-64) and
is growing rapidly (2.06%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 3)
Accustomed to undemanding government or private sector jobs as
a reward for political loyalty is expected and pervasive although these
highly sought positions are becoming increasingly sparse. (Pollack, 105)
The rapid population growth 'has contributed to some of the highest
levels of unemployment in the world and relatively low employment-topopulation ratios.' (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008,
232) High unemployment, in turn, is breeding restlessness and religious
extremism while the rapidly growing population increases the burden of
the state to provide material benefits to keep the population submissive.
(Pollack, 107)
42

(Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 193)
Kenneth Pollack writes 'Paranoia is a guiding principle of all of the
Muslim Middle Eastern regimes, to a greater or lesser extent.' (Pollack,
103) James Quinlivan asserts the House of Saud has successfully applied
balancing mechanisms to 'coup-proof the regime, a mission 'best
accomplished by a ground-based parallel military'. (Quinlivan 1999, 142)
Data from 2008 validates Quinlivan's assertion. The Army has 75,000
soldiers, whereas the National Guard has 75,000 full-time soldiers and
25,000 reserves. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 260,
262) A review of the staffing levels of other states in the Middle East
suggests not only is Saudi Arabia's conventional Army to parallel military
staffing ratio is high but the size of the conventional Army appears
disproportionately small. Bahrain (6000 to 2000), Kuwait (11,000 to 6,600),
and Oman (25,000 to 4,000) are three other GCC member states with
parallel militaries. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 238,
250-251, 257-258) At 88,000 soldiers, Jordan's conventional Army is 17%
larger than Saudi Arabia's; even the United Arab Emirates' Army has
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44,000 soldiers, 59% the size of Saudi Arabia, which is approximately 2.5
times the geographic size and has roughly five times the population of
either state. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 248, 266)
Ghassane Salameh and Vivian Steir assert the House of Saud faces
a 'dilemma between defending the country and defending the
monarchy,' further writing 'the monarchy, anxious to defend its wealth,
seems to fear the potentially high political price of a strong army.'
(Salameh and Steir, 9) F. Gregory Gause III argues 'experience with
several attempted Arab-nationalist military coups in the 1960s undermined
the regime's confidence in the likely political reliability of a large military,'
further stating 'Residual suspicion of Hijazis and Shi'ites add to the regime's
reluctance to expand the size of the Saudi military, an argument shared
by Salamah and Steir (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 202) Hinnebusch
argues the military is the most common instrument of regime change in
the Middle East, and that the House of Saudi perceives its ability to survive
depends on its ability to control the military and organized labor, 'the two
groups that were the potential vehicles of opposition,' citing a defection
of Saudi pilots to Egypt in the 1960s and the crushing of a Libyan-inspired
plot as adding to the suspicion of the House of Saud. (Hinnebusch, 124125)43 Citing Gause, Hinnebusch theorizes the House of Saud has not
increased the size of the Army 'from fear that a conscripted population
would demand political rights or that a large Army would inevitably recruit
from more plebian ranks of society whose loyalty to the monarchy could
be suspect.' (Hinnebusch, 128)
At the present time there is no shortage of native manpower to
increase the size of the conventional Army, the size of which, measured in
terms of staffing, has not increased since 2000. (The International Institute
for Strategic Studies 2000, 230) through (The International Institute for
Strategic Studies 2008, 260) Improved medical care as a result of the oil
boom that started in the early 1970s lead to rapidly increasing population,
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and currently the Kingdom's population is disproportionately young.
(Pollack, 70-72) Presently there are 7.4 million males between the age of
18-49 fit for military service and each year some 272,000 males reach the
military service age. (Central Intelligence Agency, 11)
44

For an overview of Iranian challenges to Saudi Arabia's Islamic
credentials after the Iranian Revolution see: (Badeeb, 91) discusses a
'Joint Islamic Committee' proposed by Iran, who claimed the House of
Saud is incapable of managing the affairs of Meccah and Madinah;
(Bronson, 146) claims Khomeini 'challenged Saudi Arabia's position as the
international mouthpiece for the Prophet Muhammad;' (Hinnebusch, 194)
mentions efforts by the Iranian government to 'discredit Saudi Arabia as
an alternative (and conservative) centre of Islam in Sunni Muslim opinion;'
(Korany and Dessouki, 343) states Khomeini repeatedly declared 'that
monarchy is incompatible with the Qur'an's basic tenets;' finally,
(Ramazani, 92) states 'the Saudis believe that the Islamic basis of the
legitimacy of their state and rule has been challenged.'
45

For an overview of Iranian attempts to subvert the government of Saudi
Arabia see: (Badeeb, 90), (Bronson, 146-147), (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami,
197), and (Sandwick, 170) discuss attempts by the Iranian government to
incite Saudi Shi'a in the Eastern Province to overthrow the Saudi Arabian
government. (Bronson, 146-147) further suggests 'religious empowerment
in Iran' as a contributing factor of labor unrest in the Eastern province in
1977 and 1978. Iranian-sanctioned demonstrations during the annual Hajj
season are detailed in (Badeeb, 91) and (Ramazani, 95). Terrorist attacks
with suspected official sanction by Iran, including the 1996 bombing of
Khobar Towers, are discussed by (Badeeb, 92), (Bronson, 216), and
(Pollack, 170). Iran did not limit its intent to export its revolution solely to
Saudi Arabia; (Hinnebusch, 195-196), (Ramazani, 90), (Safran, 376), and
(Sandwick, 151) discuss Iranian attempts to destabilize the governments of
Kuwait and Bahrain.

86

46

(The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 260), (Pollack, 359,
363)
47
(Pollack, 170)
48
The Saudi Arabian Government is expanding its internal security forces.
See (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, 216) for
expansion of the Saudi Arabian National Guard.
For more information on Project MIKAS, a sophisticated border surveillance
system intended to detect land and sea incursions, see (The International
Institute for Strategic Studies 2007, 214)
For information on the newly created Industrial Security Forces, who will
share joint responsibility with the National Guard to protect oil installations,
see (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008, 262).
The Special Emergency Forces are the Kingdom's primary anti-terrorism
forces: see (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, The Gulf Forces in an Era of
Assymetric Warfare: Saudi Arabia 2006, 66) for more information.
Three recent publications discuss unconventional means the Saudi
Arabian Government is utilizing to rehabilitate citizens accused or
suspected of participating in unconventional warfare, and theorize
measures taken appear to be effective. See 'Powers of Persuasion' in The
Economist, July 17, 2008, 'The Struggle against al-Qaeda' in The
Economist, October 25, 2008, and 'Deprogramming Jihadists' in The New
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